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OCI No. 2015/67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
3 December 1967

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Cyprus Situation  
(As of 4:00 PM EST)

1. The ball is now in the Turkish court following U Thant's appeal for an accord this morning to the governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The Greeks delivered a positive response from Athens to the proposals almost immediately, and are apparently willing to begin withdrawal of their "illegal" troop contingent shortly after the Turks have hopefully agreed to the U Thant plea. The Turkish Foreign Minister, however, stressed in a conversation this morning with the US Ambassador in Ankara that his government will probably insist on retaining the precise wording of the controversial paragraph four in the original accord accepted by Greece and Turkey, but rejected by Makarios. The U Thant appeal omits the clause specifying the removal of "all forces constituted since 1963," thus making Turkish approval of the draft unlikely on the grounds of the morning conversation.

2. There is no word from Nicosia as yet, but Makarios may well find the proposals acceptable. Meanwhile, Presidential Envoy Vance told the press tonight that he has completed his mission and is returning to the United States.

State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
3 December 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Cyprus Situation  
(As of 12:00 Noon EST)

1. Presidential Envoy Vance reports that Cypriot President Makarios has rejected "paragraph 4" of the proposed Cyprus settlement. The draft paragraph which Makarios rejected was the original paragraph written by the Turkish Government and accepted by the Greeks, with the addition of one sentence making available the UN Secretary-General's good offices. It calls for an "enlarged and improved mandate", the disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963, and the creation of new safeguards for internal security.

2. The Secretary-General has sent his appeal, apparently based on the four paragraphs in the Turkish draft, to the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and to the Cypriot government as well. He plans to announce the appeal at 12:30 this afternoon. Vance had suggested that the appeal be issued before Makarios could issue his own call for a meeting of the Security Council. Both Makarios and Kyprianou had indicated previously that they intended to request a Security Council session if the talks with Vance failed. Vance plans to return to Athens.

3. The appeal which Greek Prime Minister Kollias sent to Makarios strongly urged that the Cypriot Government accept the draft proposals, lest the three countries return to an "extremely dangerous situation". He adds that he supposes that the Cypriots "have no doubts as to the reality of the Turkish threat", and "are aware of the limited assistance" which Greece could offer in a struggle which would cause "incalculable disaster to the Cypriot people".

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
3 December 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Supplement to the Cyprus Situation  
(As of 8:00 AM EST)

1. Vance has been unable to make much headway with Makarios on his second trip to Nicosia. During the prolonged discussions on 2 December, which featured the presentation of three separate "hopeless" alternatives to the disputed section of the original agreements, a "painful polishing of every word in the stodgy texts", and several walks in the rose garden, forward progress consisted of Makarios, reluctant agreement to "discuss" the matter at issue in the UN Security Council. He informed Vance that he had no desire to please the Turks, and that he had only approved this last draft on a "take it or leave it" basis.

2. The GOT has rejected the text proposed by Makarios, and Vance has now been authorized to go back to Makarios and try to get him to accept the version of the disputed passage (paragraph 4) originally submitted by the Turks. It is felt that this may be closer to what Makarios wants than the language as it now stands.

3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that the only version of Paragraph 4 which has a chance of being accepted by all parties is the original Turkish text. That is now unwilling to agree to UNFICYP's taking on additional duties under the present mandate because Finland, a heavy troop contributor to UNFICYP, objects to doing this without Security Council authorization. Goldberg understands that there is "no ultimatum spirit" on the Turkish side in the present discussions.

4. The GOT's position on the renewed haggling over paragraph four is fairly flexible. They would be

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willing to accept the text taken to Athens by Vance on 28 November and also the one agreed to on 1 December. Foreign Ministry General Secretary Turkmen (who is usually right) thinks they would accept an addition to paragraph 4 allowing the interested parties to work out the "specifics" with the UNSYG. Both Turkmen and Caglayangil think it would be dangerous to have to go before the hawkish Turkish cabinet with basic revisions of the language which the cabinet has already approved.

5. Ambassador Talbot believes that if present negotiations fail and if Turkey invades Cyprus Greece will attack Turkish targets at sea. He also thinks that the present Greek government could not survive if it failed to do this, and sees a more extremist and bitterly anti-American government in Greece emerging in the aftermath of the power struggle.

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7. Vance will meet again with Makarios at 1300 local time (6 A.M. EST) and will try to get his agreement on keeping the original text of paragraph 4 and adding a final sentence agreed to by the GOT and GOG. He hopes to keep the talk going until 8 A.M. EST, and then, if he fails, recommends that the UNSYG issue the appeal. (According to Goldberg Thant is ready to go ahead). Vance suspects that Makarios will go on the radio after the meeting and call for a Security Council meeting, which would make it more difficult for Thant to issue the appeal, and he wants to forestall this.

8. Hart and Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil have had another marathon conference, with Hart trying to get Caglayangil to take the latest version hammered out by Vance (Makarios has made a small concession) back to the Turkish cabinet for approval. Both Caglayangil and Demirel oppose this since it would amount to asking the hawkish cabinet to endorse the exact opposite of what

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they were with great difficulty talked into several days ago.

9. Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis will ask King Constantine to make final appeal to Makarios to accept the original version of paragraph 4, pointing out several advantages to Cyprus in it and warning against the consequences both to Cyprus and to Hellenism. Pipinelis is not certain the King will do this without a cabinet meeting, which would take too much time, nor that Makarios will respond positively, although he thinks he could do so without harm to his position.

10. Ambassador Goldberg does not think Thant will be ready to issue the appeal by 8 A.M. EST, as suggested by Vance.

11. The appeal to Makarios which Pipinelis had hoped to get King Constantine to sign has gone out signed by Greek Prime Minister Kollias.

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